Comments on: We Want Narrative, But Get Cacophony

By: Alex Rukundo

Alex Rukundo — Sat, 22 Jan 2011 09:27:33 +0000

This is a repeat!
Not a combatant or soldier but tend to agree that for any strategy (ANY) to work, it must be adaptable to suit local nuisances or it will all be in vain. One of the reasons the “Surge” succeeded in Iraq was not purely due to the fact that there was a new COIN manual being implemented, rather after a certain period of time when US/ UK/ Allied Forces started understanding local nuisances, knowledge and intelligence, was it then possible to flood areas to seize, build and hold, whilst protecting populations. Note, however, alot of pre-work went into this- meaning better access to intelligence and the modus operandi of insurgent groups, turn-coats who were tired of fighting, better force/ army knowledge of how to behave infront/ with the locals (who inturn trusted UK/ US forces and hence gave then info/ intel), better experience with guys who had been there 2-4 Tours and knew terrain, streets, areas (without necessarily relying on Googlemap and Satpix); Iraq government assistance/ aggressiveness/ assertiveness and lastly geo-political realignment from most of the countries arrayed towards Iraq (Iran, Syria, Turkey, Saudi/ Gulf states, Al Qaeda itself). Remember the US/ UK proactively and aggresively went after Al Qods, Iranian Intel, Syrian baathists and intel and took the war to their doorstep(this made them understand they were playing with fire).

The Afghanistan surge will only work if all the above action and understanding is realised with a caveat that the people are distinctly different, non-Arab and fiercely tribal as opposed to the Iraqis who were pretty much Westernised or civilised to a large extent.

Finally, deadlines and too much public detail about operations (kinetic/ covert), Allied modus operandi as well as lack of strategic depth in countries that are currently gunning for UK/US to fail, will also limit quick success- they need to be dealt with thoroughly and aggresively.

God Bless you guys.

By: Perspectives

Perspectives — Fri, 21 Jan 2011 00:36:40 +0000

Where’s the 5W of Goals in Afghanistan?…

Historically, Wars are made up of multiple battles with a Nation-State enemy commanding its own military forces, whose capital is generally captured and Generals/Politicians forced to the table of surrender. Civil Wars are more difficult to define in t…

By: WOTN

WOTN — Thu, 20 Jan 2011 22:01:21 +0000

Well said and as articulate as always Ole Blue.

In order to achieve that narrative, it takes not only leadership and vision from the top, but also evidence at the bottom. Information from ISAF/DoD improved greatly with General McChrystal and for some time held steady or improved with General Petraeus, though it has recently seen a decline.

The individual stories are the building blocks of the wider story. An enemy atrocity, a new school, a booming bazaar, a model nursery, or fish farm, alongside the combat reports of Talib/Haqqani Leaders killed or captured each provide a part of the story. These are the trees of the forest and we provide them at http://waronterrornews.typepad.com/home/afghanistan/

The evidence is there and there is room for someone to paint the bigger picture. At the upper left of the sidebar is a search engine that one can use to find what they need for any topic on the site, to piece together the story of how the Marines tamed Marjah. It searches related sites, for what we may have missed.

Not every story provides the why, nor relates how it fits into the bigger picture, but together the forest becomes clearer. One can examine the bark or can visualize the outline of the forest, but it’s difficult to maintain focus on both at once, but a team together can see the big picture and the details that create it, together, at the same time.