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 20 Jan 2011 @ 12:08 PM 
 

We Want Narrative, But Get Cacophony

 

From an email from a friend, MP, seeking input on understanding Afghanistan:

I’m missing a narrative for the war in Afghanistan. That certainly needs to start at the very top of the civilian leadership, be reinforced by military leadership, and be lived by all involved.

I mean, if you ask most people what it’s about they might be able to say something about denying the enemy (AQ, Taliban) a safe haven from which to operate and hurt us at home.

And I think many people who read milblogs might be able to tell you a story or two about individual courage and sacrifice amongst our warriors.

But what is totally absent is the whole middle part. In Iraq, the Army didn’t do a great job with that either, but they did put out some stuff that the milblogs were able to amplify with their coverage.

For example, where are the Travis Patriquins of the war in Afg? The COL MacFarlands? They brought Petraeus back but where is he? Where are the stories that Roggio used to cover so well, talking about the Anbar Awakening before it was called that? Or giving context to operations like those which severed the “ratlines” from Syria?

The military doesn’t even seem to bother with dopey stories about opening schools or helping farmers anymore. That’s pretty bad! Because if they did even that, perhaps some bloggers would publish them with commentary that could stimulate thinking and conversation.

What MP is actually looking for is that mid- to low-level narrative that describes what our Soldiers and Marines are doing on the ground. Of course, my response is to go on about statements of national strategy. But that’s where the narrative begins. I will tell you that the mid- to low-level narrative is stronger on the ground in Afghanistan… at least in some circles… than it is here. There is such a tremendous disconnect between the national conversation regarding Afghanistan here in the US and what is actually being done on the ground over there. That disconnect has left gaping holes in the narrative here, and those gaping holes leave broad spaces where there is no ability to connect with what our Soldiers and Marines are actually doing there on a day-to-day basis. This is where MP senses the lack of narrative; it is the narrative that MP looks for and wishes to connect with. And, sadly, it’s missing. From my perspective, that comes from the top.

The missing narrative starts with the civilian leadership and extends from there. The civilian leadership doesn’t know how to clearly articulate its goals in a simple and accurate message. Obama states some fairly nebulous goals that appear to be disconnected from our actions on the ground. I mean, for the average citizen, what does rendering al Qaeda harmless have to do with “nation-building” in Afghanistan? Isn’t al Qaeda mostly in Pakistan now? What about Yemen? The narrative is broken from the top down, from that first sentence. It’s a failure in leadership, leaving a vacuum that is filled with a sea of voices all shouting to be heard. People try to interpret the narrative from that sentence on down, and the lack of clarity in instilling a visualization of what it’s supposed to look like juxtaposed with actions that don’t seem to entirely suit the scant high-level narrative leaves a lot of room for that cacophony to grow. The individual voices in that sea are influenced by their own standpoints and goals. Most just repeat buzzwords and really can’t envision the problem they are trying to solve with any clarity themselves. It’s outside of their frame of reference, which often gets more rigid with age and not more flexible.

In warfare in general, but counterinsurgency in particular, there are always at least three narratives, but they respond to each other and bounce off of each other. There is the official narrative, the unofficial narrative (the media), and then there is the enemy narrative, which is compared to and contrasted against the official narrative. The unofficial or popular (media) narrative is critical of the official narrative; it questions it, explores it and hammers it when it is in any way deficient, false or inconsistent. The enemy narrative is often delivered unfiltered and without substantive critique.

No one here in the US has a clear grasp of what is going on there, but oh so many cry out to be heard. With the “official” narrative weaker than water, it’s easy to lose reality in the sea of voices who shout down each other in competition to become the main narrative. Again, it’s a question of leadership, and at the upper levels, our leadership’s message is weak. The mid and lower level messages will stem from the overarching narrative, but that overarching narrative doesn’t seem to describe what we are actually doing on the ground, and so there is a disconnect. It cannot begin with GEN Petraeus’ narrative. His narrative must support and inform the national discourse. Without the underpinnings of a clear statement that his narrative dovetails with, it is cast adrift and easily derided as being somehow unsupported and unsupportable. The last general who tried to command the narrative, unsupported by the civilian leadership, is now in unscheduled retirement.

Disconnects leave a vacuum, and politics (the narratives are all about politics), like nature, abhors a vacuum. Communications abhors a vacuum as well, and competing interests will always vie for influence over the narrative… especially when the narrative has no central theme. Afghanistan is more confusing than Iraq in many ways, and so the narrative is difficult to begin with, but our national narrative is so scattered that it almost seems not to exist. MP is not the only one who misses it and looks for it. Everyone does in one way or another, and so the dominant narrative here is a disjointed argument over bullshit.

For me, what is most troubling about this disconnect are the memes that arise from the cacophony and eventually become accepted as truths. Folks, a lot of our “talking heads” are talking out of the other end, but they sound so sage while doing it that when they further a meme, you wouldn’t know it. And they’re paid to know what they’re talking about, right? Yeah, in a perfect world. There are only a couple of journalists out there who know COIN from a hole in the ground. It’s like chewing broken glass to listen to them flail away at the concept. It’s stunning that some of most educated observers who do understand it cannot enunciate it clearly, and when they do they are shouted down by the mass of voices competing to gain control of the narrative left adrift, often for their own reasons. There is no room for a consistent mid- or low-level narrative to emerge from this. Military commentators like COL Gentile and politically-driven think-tankers like Michael Cohen wouldn’t be able to propagate their memes if the successes that do exist were properly documented and narrated. They would be forced to think harder and be more rigorous in their criticisms. Cohen and Gentile’s personal narratives haven’t progressed in over three years because they haven’t needed to. They, and others, can criticize a weakly stated strategy easily with broad and unsupported strokes and reduce the narrative to a squabble over tactics that could be put to bed readily with an accurate tactical narrative that didn’t look like a kaleidoscope.

What would our narrative look like? I don’t think that “feel good” type stories of the type that we saw in the early days would do it for me. Building schools always looks good, but it may not be the best thing for a given community at a given time. Stories that give the background of why a decision has been made, that show the details of really excellent stabilization activities would really grab me. I would love to see a narrative about the successes that Community Development Councils have achieved while our Soldiers and Marines helped to provide the requisite bubble of security, working hand in hand with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). A narrative that shows our young men and women, both civilian and military, engaging in reestablishing local capacity to manage their own affairs in a mode higher than basic survival mode would be awesome; because this is happening in discrete local areas in Afghanistan. A narrative that shows that the shift is happening from a centralized government focus to building the solid footing of local governance would be great. A strong narrative would show that these traditional local structures have in the past and can now be linked in an Afghan way to a central government, that this cross-pollination of legitimacy at the local and national levels is an Afghan phenomenon and that we are learning to foster this. A great narrative would put to rest the exotification of Afghans, showing them for the human beings that are more similar to our great grandparents than we are. A great narrative would show the progress that our Soldiers and Marines are risking life and limb to enable, and the hard work being done by smart people from USAID and State to assist. A great narrative would show the heroism not only of these best and brightest that America has to offer, but would also highlight the heroism of our Afghan allies (which I know is there, because I’ve seen it with my own eyes). Now that would be a narrative.

It would also be a narrative that would engender truly thoughtful and incisive criticism which would lead to sharpening the edge rather than being mere oppositional horseshit. A true dialog would be a lot more helpful than a bunch of shrieking voices all in opposition to each other, almost none of which really know what they’re talking about.

Information dominance starts with strongly and clearly stating your objectives and then ensuring that all of your actions are in support of that clearly stated goal. When everyone knows what right is supposed to look like, then they can recognize what wrong looks like and offer truly constructive criticism. A real narrative would look more like a steady stream of consciousness instead of a cacophony of geese staking out nesting sites.

Yeah, MP, we are all missing that narrative.

 

Responses to this post » (3 Total)

 
  1. WOTN says:

    Well said and as articulate as always Ole Blue.

    In order to achieve that narrative, it takes not only leadership and vision from the top, but also evidence at the bottom. Information from ISAF/DoD improved greatly with General McChrystal and for some time held steady or improved with General Petraeus, though it has recently seen a decline.

    The individual stories are the building blocks of the wider story. An enemy atrocity, a new school, a booming bazaar, a model nursery, or fish farm, alongside the combat reports of Talib/Haqqani Leaders killed or captured each provide a part of the story. These are the trees of the forest and we provide them at http://waronterrornews.typepad.com/home/afghanistan/

    The evidence is there and there is room for someone to paint the bigger picture. At the upper left of the sidebar is a search engine that one can use to find what they need for any topic on the site, to piece together the story of how the Marines tamed Marjah. It searches related sites, for what we may have missed.

    Not every story provides the why, nor relates how it fits into the bigger picture, but together the forest becomes clearer. One can examine the bark or can visualize the outline of the forest, but it’s difficult to maintain focus on both at once, but a team together can see the big picture and the details that create it, together, at the same time.

  2. Perspectives says:

    Where’s the 5W of Goals in Afghanistan?…

    Historically, Wars are made up of multiple battles with a Nation-State enemy commanding its own military forces, whose capital is generally captured and Generals/Politicians forced to the table of surrender. Civil Wars are more difficult to define in t…

  3. Alex Rukundo says:

    This is a repeat!
    Not a combatant or soldier but tend to agree that for any strategy (ANY) to work, it must be adaptable to suit local nuisances or it will all be in vain. One of the reasons the “Surge” succeeded in Iraq was not purely due to the fact that there was a new COIN manual being implemented, rather after a certain period of time when US/ UK/ Allied Forces started understanding local nuisances, knowledge and intelligence, was it then possible to flood areas to seize, build and hold, whilst protecting populations. Note, however, alot of pre-work went into this- meaning better access to intelligence and the modus operandi of insurgent groups, turn-coats who were tired of fighting, better force/ army knowledge of how to behave infront/ with the locals (who inturn trusted UK/ US forces and hence gave then info/ intel), better experience with guys who had been there 2-4 Tours and knew terrain, streets, areas (without necessarily relying on Googlemap and Satpix); Iraq government assistance/ aggressiveness/ assertiveness and lastly geo-political realignment from most of the countries arrayed towards Iraq (Iran, Syria, Turkey, Saudi/ Gulf states, Al Qaeda itself). Remember the US/ UK proactively and aggresively went after Al Qods, Iranian Intel, Syrian baathists and intel and took the war to their doorstep(this made them understand they were playing with fire).

    The Afghanistan surge will only work if all the above action and understanding is realised with a caveat that the people are distinctly different, non-Arab and fiercely tribal as opposed to the Iraqis who were pretty much Westernised or civilised to a large extent.

    Finally, deadlines and too much public detail about operations (kinetic/ covert), Allied modus operandi as well as lack of strategic depth in countries that are currently gunning for UK/US to fail, will also limit quick success- they need to be dealt with thoroughly and aggresively.

    God Bless you guys.

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