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 18 Jun 2011 @ 2:57 PM 
 

The Enemy Within

 

The report discussed in the NYT is not new. I read the report about six weeks ago, and from personal experience it makes some sense. I would encourage leaders preparing to deploy to read it. This is why I’m disappointed that ISAF is refuting the report rather than learning from it. At least they appear to not be taking it seriously. If this is true, it is a mistake.

Granted, the sample was small and geographically limited. The sampling of US troops is even smaller than the sample of Afghans. So, yes, the report has limitations. It is less science than it is anecdotal… but as a combat advisor who has worked with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), the report does carry the ring of truth. The NYT scarcely touches on the real point; the enemy is within… us. It turns out that most of the fratricidal murders that have occurred were not the work of insurgent infiltrators, but the work of very angry ANSF. It is easier to put more money into vetting ANSF recruits than it is to effectively deal with the real problem.

Our counterinsurgency manual lists a set of behaviors that are historically proven to be unsuccessful practices. One of those is a “low priority on quality advisors.” Army Special Forces have a selection process that is designed to weed out those who, among other things, are not suited to working with indigenous peoples. My own experience demonstrates what every other non-SF combat advisor knows; we were not selected based upon on any key criteria for what it takes to be a high quality advisor. We were warm bodies with the requisite military skill set and the requisite rank. Some didn’t even have those prerequisites; they simply had a pulse. There was no personality testing. There was no stress testing. There was no selection process. Individual team chiefs (those who actually had an opportunity and a pool to select from) sometimes made efforts to select a quality team… mostly based on records reviews and interviews, which are very limited in what they can tell a leader. It was a shot in the dark. Mostly, it has worked out. We are discussing what happens when it doesn’t.

Trends emerged. Guardsmen turned out to be particularly well-suited to advisor roles. This does not mean that Regular Army officers and NCO’s were never successful; there are lots of success stories. But, on the whole, the Guard is better suited to advisory roles. It is generally accepted that Guardsmen have more well-rounded experience based on their immersion in civilian culture. There is a lot there to be plumbed; another entire discussion could be had about what the reasons for this phenomenon are. At this point, suffice to say that it has been more than adequately demonstrated to those of us who have served in close relationships with ANSF that some people have absolutely no business being in proximity to Afghans. We have all seen them, Guard and Regular alike; they are a danger to themselves and others, and sometimes they have gotten people killed. The last several paragraphs address the advisor issue, but more and more American line troops, not trained as advisors, are coming into constant contact with ANSF.

These types of killings are not new, but there has been an increase. The article quotes the report’s author, Dr. Bordin, as stating that 16% of hostile Coalition deaths are attributable to these fratricidal murders. I don’t know if this is accurate, but any other problem, the resolution of which could result in 16% fewer casualties, would be attacked with vigor. Well, they are attacking… but they are attacking the statistically much less significant problem of preventing insurgent infiltrators. It appears that the problems that contribute to the majority of these events are being left to smolder, dismissed by officials. Those officials can smear the techniques, they can smear the language, but I’m here to tell you that the message makes sense to me and many other advisors, and it can be addressed just as the military addresses any other recognized source of injuries and deaths; command emphasis.

A few questions may come to mind. Why would a non-insurgent Afghan soldier or policeman decide to open fire on his own allies? The report indicates a number of reasons, key among them being issues related to respect. Profane language and behavior are cited.

Afghans do not use profanity in their language as a matter of course. In the American military, the use of profanity surpasses even the use of profanity in American culture in general (with the possible exception of gangsta rap). Use of the f-bomb is rampant in American movies. Profane name-calling is an art form. In Afghan culture, to insinuate even jokingly that a man has intimate relations with his mother is an offense so great that it may inspire lethal ire. Americans call each other “motherfuckers” all the time. I have witnessed American soldiers calling Afghans such things, or referring to an Afghan as such when discussing them with another Afghan. This then gets back to the Afghan so-referenced and a resentment is begun. This may seem a simple misunderstanding, but it has been known to have lethal consequences.

I’ve seen violence almost break out over cultural issues. I’ve heard Afghan soldiers make death threats against American soldiers because the American soldier made a statement about Afghan women. The American soldier who had been threatened saw hypocrisy in the anger. Afghans see American movies and the promiscuity depicted as a matter of course. They also see American porn. Afghan soldiers love American porn, and they view American women as loose. The American soldier had been listening to his Afghan counterparts talking about American women, became irritated and said that he wanted to see photos of naked Afghan women. That was all it took. It could have resulted in a killing, but the situation was diffused and the soldier was strongly admonished not to engage in such discussions with Afghans for any reason. He survived. Others have not.

Basically, the problem is akin to racism; ignorance and arrogance combine to form a sense of natural superiority that is difficult and sometimes impossible to overcome. Just as many do not suffer from such delusions, some do things that endanger themselves and others. We have a military culture that is not only fond of profanity, it is fond of judging one’s self in relation to others. Esprit d’ corps is often built upon inculcating the belief that the members of a given unit are somehow superior and more elite than members of another unit. Now, how is a young man who has been raised since he was at the tail end of his childhood to believe that this is how to judge others (especially those in uniform) supposed to suddenly suspend this value system because he is put into close daily contact with indigenous forces?

It is nigh on impossible. Some will have the personal characteristics to overcome it, but enough who cannot will make it into these close situations. Some leaders, even some commanders, will recognize the danger and take action. Enough do not, and there is no higher-level emphasis that this is a responsibility of leadership; to recognize and remove such threats from our own ranks. To do so leaves us even more short-handed than we appear to be on paper. To not do so leaves us open to up to 16% higher casualties.

Why has the rate of such incidents increased? What has changed? An emphasis on “partnering” with Afghan units and a move away from emphasizing advising/mentoring. The cited report indicates that ANSF had uniformly positive impressions of American advisors, such as ETT’s and PMT’s, and are less happy with American units more recently. American and Coalition regular units are being placed in close living and working situations with ANSF on a frequent basis. This is, overall, a good thing; even if the advising is being downplayed (generally, there is a mixture). However, since we have the immature and arrogant in our midst, there is a greater potential for dangerous situations to occur. They have, in fact.

Younger soldiers who have been in a strictly military environment since shortly after they graduated from high school have a greater tendency to be unable to adapt to the cultural differences between Afghans and Americans. They are more likely to blithely err in ways that are not intuitively dangerous to American youth. Add to this the small but significant enough number of officers and NCO’s who are unable to effectively work with ANSF and you have a recipe for isolated outbreaks of lethal violence among allies.

While cultural training has improved, it is spotty in its stress on language and gestures. Afghan cultural training often stresses not using the left hand to gesture and emphasizes never showing the soles of your feet. Well, Afghans will often wave with their left hand, especially if the right hand is busy… but they will never shake with it. They will offer the right forearm if the right hand is busy, wet or dirty. Afghans do not appreciate the carelessly rude or purposeful display of the sole of the foot, but they are not so sensitive that accidental or comfort-related moves that expose the sole are taken as an offense.

While making too much an issue of the left hand, offensive gestures and language are often overlooked. Afghans view profane language as very distasteful and ignorant (even if they are illiterate). Profane names are absolutely out and never acceptable. The thumbs-up used to be an offensive gesture, but because of its common American use, it is accepted. However, the American fist pump to the chest is the equivalent of flipping an Afghan the bird and is considered to be extremely offensive… but I’ve only seen one cultural trainer who actually explained this. It’s not just cultural training that can be improved, it’s also incorporating this knowledge into individual task training.

Recently, a National Guard unit was performing its pre-mobilization required individual task training. One of these tasks was “perform detainee operations.” The emphasis was on searching detainees. The trainers were well-rehearsed and professional, executing the task to the precise standards they were given; including how a male searches a female. Teaching male soldiers how to search females puts the idea in their heads that an American male soldier searching an Afghan female could under some bizarre circumstance be acceptable. It is never acceptable, ever (did I mention ever?). There are other ways to deal with the problem. Always. Our premobilization task training is not battle focused on the only battle these young men will serve in. We can adjust that. We can do better with tailoring our training to suit the combat environment, especially culturally.

Finally, a quote from an American officer emerges from the end of the article:

“In this culture, they shoot first, ask questions later,” said Lt. Col. David C. Simons, a spokesman for the training mission in Afghanistan. “Back in the States, if this happens a guy punches you and you walk away and hope you don’t get arrested. But here, you just hope you don’t get killed.”

Well, okay… but part of that is bullshit. Afghans do value human life, and it’s not “shoot first and ask questions later.” It’s a difference in what is worth taking life over. If you call an Afghan a “motherfucker” (just an example) and he actually understands you… as more and more of them do… you are taking your life and possibly those of your buddies into dangerous waters. Oh, and everyone has a weapon capable of ending life with the twitch of a finger. No, the questions do not need to be asked later. You have answered any question required to convince that man that you need to die based on every value he was raised with. In fact, his honor demands it. With all due respect to LTC Simons, he is a spokesman and does not appear to be an advisor. If it were shoot first and ask questions later, many more advisors would have died during the course of this war. I never walked around wondering if I was about to be shot by the Afghans I worked with. That’s a cowboy quote that is unhelpful in considering the problem. The view from Camp Eggers does not include the experience necessary to evaluate what is worth killing a man over in Afghanistan, but since he is actually in Afghanistan, it was a juicy quote that sounded ominous in the NYT. All I can say is, “Thank you, Sir.”

It’s stuff like that which makes young men go to Afghanistan fearing sudden death from any quarter. Being respectful when you are frightened is more difficult than having awareness of the cultural don’ts.

As noted, the report is not great science; but it still hits home. To ignore its findings is to continue to suffer unnecessary casualties. A recommendation to mitigate the risk is to encourage commanders and leaders in general to identify and remove from contact with Afghans any individuals who appear to lack the ability to adapt to working with ANSF. Just as each unit is mandated to have an Equal Opportunity (EO) officer or NCO to investigate and recommend action to mitigate issues of racism and sexism, a similar emphasis should be made to identify and remediate the risks of both soldiers and leaders who place their fellows at risk through imprudent language and behaviors. Education and training are helpful, but we have all seen that they are not enough. Some individuals simply will not adapt. Sometimes, in the immortal words of Offspring, “you gotta keep ‘em separated.”

If the end result is 16% fewer casualties, you tell me where the effort is a waste of time.

Tags Tags: , , ,
Categories: Afghan National Police, Afghanistan, ANA, COIN, doctrine, General Military
Posted By: Old Blue
Last Edit: 18 Jun 2011 @ 02 57 PM

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Responses to this post » (8 Total)

 
  1. Max in Paris says:

    The question would be not only to teach afghan values but also to give them some respect.
    Wich seems dificult as we are raised thinking our values are the best and commonly contemn other cultures.

  2. Old Blue says:

    Exactly, Max. That’s a great point that bears a little exploration. In my experience, most people have the ability to be respectful of others, and good cultural training helps. It cannot change an individual who is culturally arrogant or xenophobic in his own right.

    In a group of people, you will have a few who are eager to engage local people, officials and security personnel. There is another group, a larger group, that also engages well. They demonstrate genuine respect and establish relationships, but they are just a little more naturally reserved than the first group. Most people fall within this second group, with variations. Some will establish relationships with Afghans they work with and not be outgoing at all with people they don’t know and work with. Those in the first two groups generally have the ability to look past the differences and see the person.

    In the last group, there are those who have varying degrees of the contempt you spoke of. While all of them hear the message about respect, it rings hollow for them at their cores. Their attitudes towards indigenous people both civilian and military will show varying degrees of disrespect. Not just command climate, but leadership and even peer climate will genuinely affect their behaviors. The commander may have a good expectation for his command climate, but units are scattered and the commander can’t be everywhere. A strong climate of acceptance of Afghans can go a long way towards setting boundaries for the troops to stay within.

    Still, disrespect requires no interpreter. That is why there is no choice but to keep an eye on the behaviors of the troops… and leaders… and identify those who fall into the third group. Very often the first indication is in conversation with other team members. Revulsion, disgust, expressions of inherent distrust not of individuals but of Afghans as a group should be taken seriously. Leaders should notice these behaviors and be prepared to take actions up to and including shuffling personnel into positions which minimize their potential to be disruptive to relations with both officials and civilians.

    Education which informs training can establish expectations. It can help most to know what to expect and to have their minds open to different people. There are some who it can apparently never reach. This is not as straightforward as many basic military skills, such as selecting a firing position or actions when and IED is identified. It is also difficult to adjust for or identify in training. Unless an individual says or does something extreme prior to deployment, it is unlikely that those who cannot develop respect for Afghans will become obvious prior to deployment.

    It sounds like something that leaders and troops should not have to do. Most will complete their deployments with no serious incidents, or at least incidents that cause physical harm or even the threat of it. Fratricidal murder is only the most extreme manifestation of the problems of respect that can occur on both sides. There are many degrees of upset that can be caused by those who blatantly disrespect Afghan colleagues and civilians, including being another straw on the camel’s back. The actions of an individual, or a group led by a leader who cannot develop respect for the host nation, may add to discontent that erupts later, perhaps more dangerously.

    Thanks for the comment, Max!

  3. Max in Paris says:

    The armed forces should teach ethics from basic training.

  4. [...] Original-Artikel erschien auf Afghan Quest: The Enemy Within, von Old Blue, [...]

  5. Kanani says:

    An incredible article. Thank you for your thoughts on this –I agree with you!

    The observation that older, National Guard soldiers perform much better in advisory roles doesn’t surprise me. It’s the broad platform of life experience, of having to get along in the civilian world for your bread and butter, along with a seasoning of maturity that makes the difference.

  6. Jack in Tucson says:

    I agree about educating troops about the local culture and customs. I’m old and retired from the USAF, but throughout my entire career I encountered guys that didn’t know how to act in certain situations – especially overseas. I recall some black USAF personnel walking around in Adana, Turkey trying to talk 70’s jive slang to some black men on the street. The African guys thought they were nuts! Also experienced some guys talking about our Turkish driver’s daughters. He got very angry – rightfully so. He understood enough English to figure it out. I also had to tell a friend to knock off the nasty language in the base bowling alley with kids bowling on the next lane. Most GI’s are able to be respectful when required, some others are not. There’s a time and place for certain language and actions, and there’s a time and place to mind your manners. There is no way around using AFN and interpreters in Afghanistan. We have to do so wisely and to best affect. If that takes teaching manners, then teach manners.

  7. Elric says:

    The ETT training I had was (to me) stereotypical. Soles of the feet, check. No ogling the babes. Check. Start meetings with the question-answer-question-answer (how are your chickens? Fine. How are your goats? Bountiful…). But there was little on the background to why things were as they are.
    Tribalism, for instance. Sign of a primitive culture, or quite possibly a conscious decision for mutual security in absence of an effective central police?
    Sharia law… For the local inhabitants, is it an outpouring of raw emotion, or is it to an extent a lack of a central justice system that is effective?
    Corruption. In a country with no retirement, how are the less fortunate supported? Is that local man of importance helping others with that 10% skim, or is it all going into his electronic bank account and being safely held in Dubai?
    In Bosnia, the old guard was forced into making changes, then they were removed as needed. Different mandate, I guess.

  8. kredite says:

    Teach afghans values?

    Guy, they have values already. That their values are different
    than western nations does not invalidate them.

    usmc

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